ref: 54bac038f411c10a596adf84c06df32f8c7c4c53
dir: /man/6/login/
.TH LOGIN 6 .SH NAME login \- key exchange protocol .SH DESCRIPTION The following encrypted key exchange protocol is used between a client such as .B login in .IR security-login (2), and a certificate signing process such as .IR logind (8), to justify the latter's issuing a certificate that can later be presented to an Inferno service to establish credentials. .PP A shared secret must previously be agreed between user and certifying authority (CA). It is used by the protocol to establish a secure channel between user and CA. .PP In the description below: .TF key(m) .PD .TP .I ivec is an 8 byte random number (`initialisation vector') chosen for this conversation. .TP .I sha is the 20 byte secure hash (SHA-1) of the password .TP .I key is an 8 byte secret formed as follows: .EX .br key[0] = ivec[0]^sha[0]^sha[8]^sha[16] key[1] = ivec[1]^sha[1]^sha[9]^sha[17] .EE \&... .EX key[5] = ivec[5]^sha[5]^sha[13]; key[6] = ivec[6]^sha[6]^sha[14]; key[7] = ivec[7]^sha[7]^sha[15]; .EE .TP .I alpha is a Diffie-Hellman base used system wide .TP .I p is a Diffie-Hellman modulus used system wide .TP .I "key(m)" is .I m encrypted using the RC4 algorithm with .IR key . .TP .I Rx is a random number of the same order as .IR p . .TP .I "secret" is the Diffie-Hellman secret .IR "alpha**(r0*r1) mod p" . .PP The protocol follows. ``user→CA xxx'' means that the user sends the message ``xxx'' to the certifying authority. Any party can send an error instead of a message at any point to terminate the protocol. .IP .EX user→CA name CA→user ACK .sp 1v user→CA ivec CA→user key(alpha**r0 mod p), alpha, p .sp 1v user→CA alpha**r1 mod p CA→user CA's public key, SHA(CA's public key + secret) .sp 1v user→CA user's public key, SHA(user's public key + secret) CA→user user's public key certificate .EE .PP The complexity of this protocol is intended to shield the password. To start a clear text attack against the password, one needs to first attack the Diffie-Hellman exponential to determine .IR "alpha**r0 mod p" . A possible weakness is that the encrypted quantity is base64 encoded, constraining the possible values of each byte. This could aid a brute force attack. .PP .I Alpha and .I p are sent unprotected, though the user code does a few sanity checks on the values it receives. This is another likely point of attack. We should like to know about any. .PP The role of .I ivec is to foil any replay attacks by someone spoofing the CA though this is probably overkill. .SH SEE ALSO .IR security-intro (2), .IR security-login (2), .IR logind (8), .IR signer (8)