ref: bfe9da47cfa2f51ebef78c59332b5ba2deba306d
dir: /third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c/
/* v3_purp.c */
/*
* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
* 2001.
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1999-2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* licensing@OpenSSL.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/digest.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <openssl/obj.h>
#include <openssl/thread.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include "../internal.h"
#include "../x509/internal.h"
#include "internal.h"
#define V1_ROOT (EXFLAG_V1|EXFLAG_SS)
#define ku_reject(x, usage) \
(((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)))
#define xku_reject(x, usage) \
(((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_xkusage & (usage)))
#define ns_reject(x, usage) \
(((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) && !((x)->ex_nscert & (usage)))
static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
int ca);
static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
int ca);
static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
int ca);
static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca);
static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
int ca);
static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
int ca);
static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
int ca);
static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
int ca);
static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE **a, const X509_PURPOSE **b);
static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p);
static X509_PURPOSE xstandard[] = {
{X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT, X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT, 0,
check_purpose_ssl_client, (char *)"SSL client", (char *)"sslclient",
NULL},
{X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0,
check_purpose_ssl_server, (char *)"SSL server", (char *)"sslserver",
NULL},
{X509_PURPOSE_NS_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0,
check_purpose_ns_ssl_server, (char *)"Netscape SSL server",
(char *)"nssslserver", NULL},
{X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, check_purpose_smime_sign,
(char *)"S/MIME signing", (char *)"smimesign", NULL},
{X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_ENCRYPT, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0,
check_purpose_smime_encrypt, (char *)"S/MIME encryption",
(char *)"smimeencrypt", NULL},
{X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, check_purpose_crl_sign,
(char *)"CRL signing", (char *)"crlsign", NULL},
{X509_PURPOSE_ANY, X509_TRUST_DEFAULT, 0, no_check, (char *)"Any Purpose",
(char *)"any", NULL},
{X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, ocsp_helper,
(char *)"OCSP helper", (char *)"ocsphelper", NULL},
{X509_PURPOSE_TIMESTAMP_SIGN, X509_TRUST_TSA, 0,
check_purpose_timestamp_sign, (char *)"Time Stamp signing",
(char *)"timestampsign", NULL},
};
#define X509_PURPOSE_COUNT (sizeof(xstandard)/sizeof(X509_PURPOSE))
static STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE) *xptable = NULL;
static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE **a, const X509_PURPOSE **b)
{
return (*a)->purpose - (*b)->purpose;
}
/*
* As much as I'd like to make X509_check_purpose use a "const" X509* I
* really can't because it does recalculate hashes and do other non-const
* things.
*/
int X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int ca)
{
int idx;
const X509_PURPOSE *pt;
if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x)) {
return -1;
}
if (id == -1)
return 1;
idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id);
if (idx == -1)
return -1;
pt = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
return pt->check_purpose(pt, x, ca);
}
int X509_PURPOSE_set(int *p, int purpose)
{
if (X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose) == -1) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, X509V3_R_INVALID_PURPOSE);
return 0;
}
*p = purpose;
return 1;
}
int X509_PURPOSE_get_count(void)
{
if (!xptable)
return X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
return sk_X509_PURPOSE_num(xptable) + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
}
X509_PURPOSE *X509_PURPOSE_get0(int idx)
{
if (idx < 0)
return NULL;
if (idx < (int)X509_PURPOSE_COUNT)
return xstandard + idx;
return sk_X509_PURPOSE_value(xptable, idx - X509_PURPOSE_COUNT);
}
int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname(char *sname)
{
int i;
X509_PURPOSE *xptmp;
for (i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i++) {
xptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i);
if (!strcmp(xptmp->sname, sname))
return i;
}
return -1;
}
int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(int purpose)
{
X509_PURPOSE tmp;
size_t idx;
if ((purpose >= X509_PURPOSE_MIN) && (purpose <= X509_PURPOSE_MAX))
return purpose - X509_PURPOSE_MIN;
tmp.purpose = purpose;
if (!xptable)
return -1;
sk_X509_PURPOSE_sort(xptable);
if (!sk_X509_PURPOSE_find(xptable, &idx, &tmp))
return -1;
return idx + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
}
int X509_PURPOSE_add(int id, int trust, int flags,
int (*ck) (const X509_PURPOSE *, const X509 *, int),
char *name, char *sname, void *arg)
{
int idx;
X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
char *name_dup, *sname_dup;
/*
* This is set according to what we change: application can't set it
*/
flags &= ~X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
/* This will always be set for application modified trust entries */
flags |= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME;
/* Get existing entry if any */
idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id);
/* Need a new entry */
if (idx == -1) {
if (!(ptmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_PURPOSE)))) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
ptmp->flags = X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
} else
ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
/* Duplicate the supplied names. */
name_dup = OPENSSL_strdup(name);
sname_dup = OPENSSL_strdup(sname);
if (name_dup == NULL || sname_dup == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
if (name_dup != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(name_dup);
if (sname_dup != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(sname_dup);
if (idx == -1)
OPENSSL_free(ptmp);
return 0;
}
/* OPENSSL_free existing name if dynamic */
if (ptmp->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) {
OPENSSL_free(ptmp->name);
OPENSSL_free(ptmp->sname);
}
/* dup supplied name */
ptmp->name = name_dup;
ptmp->sname = sname_dup;
/* Keep the dynamic flag of existing entry */
ptmp->flags &= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
/* Set all other flags */
ptmp->flags |= flags;
ptmp->purpose = id;
ptmp->trust = trust;
ptmp->check_purpose = ck;
ptmp->usr_data = arg;
/* If its a new entry manage the dynamic table */
if (idx == -1) {
if (!xptable && !(xptable = sk_X509_PURPOSE_new(xp_cmp))) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
xptable_free(ptmp);
return 0;
}
if (!sk_X509_PURPOSE_push(xptable, ptmp)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
xptable_free(ptmp);
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p)
{
if (!p)
return;
if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC) {
if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) {
OPENSSL_free(p->name);
OPENSSL_free(p->sname);
}
OPENSSL_free(p);
}
}
void X509_PURPOSE_cleanup(void)
{
unsigned int i;
sk_X509_PURPOSE_pop_free(xptable, xptable_free);
for (i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; i++)
xptable_free(xstandard + i);
xptable = NULL;
}
int X509_PURPOSE_get_id(const X509_PURPOSE *xp)
{
return xp->purpose;
}
char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(const X509_PURPOSE *xp)
{
return xp->name;
}
char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(const X509_PURPOSE *xp)
{
return xp->sname;
}
int X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(const X509_PURPOSE *xp)
{
return xp->trust;
}
static int nid_cmp(const void *void_a, const void *void_b)
{
const int *a = void_a, *b = void_b;
return *a - *b;
}
int X509_supported_extension(X509_EXTENSION *ex)
{
/*
* This table is a list of the NIDs of supported extensions: that is
* those which are used by the verify process. If an extension is
* critical and doesn't appear in this list then the verify process will
* normally reject the certificate. The list must be kept in numerical
* order because it will be searched using bsearch.
*/
static const int supported_nids[] = {
NID_netscape_cert_type, /* 71 */
NID_key_usage, /* 83 */
NID_subject_alt_name, /* 85 */
NID_basic_constraints, /* 87 */
NID_certificate_policies, /* 89 */
NID_ext_key_usage, /* 126 */
NID_policy_constraints, /* 401 */
NID_proxyCertInfo, /* 663 */
NID_name_constraints, /* 666 */
NID_policy_mappings, /* 747 */
NID_inhibit_any_policy /* 748 */
};
int ex_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex));
if (ex_nid == NID_undef)
return 0;
if (bsearch
(&ex_nid, supported_nids, sizeof(supported_nids) / sizeof(int),
sizeof(int), nid_cmp) != NULL)
return 1;
return 0;
}
static int setup_dp(X509 *x, DIST_POINT *dp)
{
X509_NAME *iname = NULL;
size_t i;
if (dp->reasons) {
if (dp->reasons->length > 0)
dp->dp_reasons = dp->reasons->data[0];
if (dp->reasons->length > 1)
dp->dp_reasons |= (dp->reasons->data[1] << 8);
dp->dp_reasons &= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
} else
dp->dp_reasons = CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
if (!dp->distpoint || (dp->distpoint->type != 1))
return 1;
for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) {
iname = gen->d.directoryName;
break;
}
}
if (!iname)
iname = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
return DIST_POINT_set_dpname(dp->distpoint, iname);
}
static int setup_crldp(X509 *x)
{
int j;
x->crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_crl_distribution_points, &j, NULL);
if (x->crldp == NULL && j != -1) {
return 0;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
if (!setup_dp(x, sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i))) {
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
int x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x)
{
BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bs;
PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci;
ASN1_BIT_STRING *usage;
ASN1_BIT_STRING *ns;
EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *extusage;
X509_EXTENSION *ex;
size_t i;
int j;
CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_read(&x->lock);
const int is_set = x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET;
CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_read(&x->lock);
if (is_set) {
return (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID) == 0;
}
CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&x->lock);
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) {
CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&x->lock);
return (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID) == 0;
}
if (!X509_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), x->sha1_hash, NULL))
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
/* V1 should mean no extensions ... */
if (X509_get_version(x) == X509_VERSION_1)
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_V1;
/* Handle basic constraints */
if ((bs = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_basic_constraints, &j, NULL))) {
if (bs->ca)
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CA;
if (bs->pathlen) {
if ((bs->pathlen->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER)
|| !bs->ca) {
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
x->ex_pathlen = 0;
} else {
/* TODO(davidben): |ASN1_INTEGER_get| returns -1 on overflow,
* which currently acts as if the constraint isn't present. This
* works (an overflowing path length constraint may as well be
* infinity), but Chromium's verifier simply treats values above
* 255 as an error. */
x->ex_pathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs->pathlen);
}
} else
x->ex_pathlen = -1;
BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bs);
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_BCONS;
} else if (j != -1) {
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
}
/* Handle proxy certificates */
if ((pci = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_proxyCertInfo, &j, NULL))) {
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA
|| X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_subject_alt_name, -1) >= 0
|| X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_issuer_alt_name, -1) >= 0) {
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
}
if (pci->pcPathLengthConstraint) {
x->ex_pcpathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pci->pcPathLengthConstraint);
} else
x->ex_pcpathlen = -1;
PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci);
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_PROXY;
} else if (j != -1) {
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
}
/* Handle key usage */
if ((usage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_key_usage, &j, NULL))) {
if (usage->length > 0) {
x->ex_kusage = usage->data[0];
if (usage->length > 1)
x->ex_kusage |= usage->data[1] << 8;
} else
x->ex_kusage = 0;
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_KUSAGE;
ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage);
} else if (j != -1) {
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
}
x->ex_xkusage = 0;
if ((extusage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, &j, NULL))) {
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_XKUSAGE;
for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(extusage); i++) {
switch (OBJ_obj2nid(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(extusage, i))) {
case NID_server_auth:
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_SERVER;
break;
case NID_client_auth:
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_CLIENT;
break;
case NID_email_protect:
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SMIME;
break;
case NID_code_sign:
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_CODE_SIGN;
break;
case NID_ms_sgc:
case NID_ns_sgc:
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SGC;
break;
case NID_OCSP_sign:
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_OCSP_SIGN;
break;
case NID_time_stamp:
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_TIMESTAMP;
break;
case NID_dvcs:
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_DVCS;
break;
case NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage:
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_ANYEKU;
break;
}
}
sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(extusage, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
} else if (j != -1) {
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
}
if ((ns = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_netscape_cert_type, &j, NULL))) {
if (ns->length > 0)
x->ex_nscert = ns->data[0];
else
x->ex_nscert = 0;
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_NSCERT;
ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(ns);
} else if (j != -1) {
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
}
x->skid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, &j, NULL);
if (x->skid == NULL && j != -1) {
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
}
x->akid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_authority_key_identifier, &j, NULL);
if (x->akid == NULL && j != -1) {
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
}
/* Does subject name match issuer ? */
if (!X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x), X509_get_issuer_name(x))) {
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SI;
/* If SKID matches AKID also indicate self signed */
if (X509_check_akid(x, x->akid) == X509_V_OK &&
!ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SS;
}
x->altname = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, &j, NULL);
if (x->altname == NULL && j != -1) {
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
}
x->nc = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_name_constraints, &j, NULL);
if (x->nc == NULL && j != -1) {
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
}
if (!setup_crldp(x)) {
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
}
for (j = 0; j < X509_get_ext_count(x); j++) {
ex = X509_get_ext(x, j);
if (OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex))
== NID_freshest_crl)
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_FRESHEST;
if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex))
continue;
if (!X509_supported_extension(ex)) {
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL;
break;
}
}
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET;
CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&x->lock);
return (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID) == 0;
}
/* check_ca returns one if |x| should be considered a CA certificate and zero
* otherwise. */
static int check_ca(const X509 *x)
{
/* keyUsage if present should allow cert signing */
if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
return 0;
/* Version 1 certificates are considered CAs and don't have extensions. */
if ((x->ex_flags & V1_ROOT) == V1_ROOT) {
return 1;
}
/* Otherwise, it's only a CA if basicConstraints says so. */
return ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) &&
(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA));
}
int X509_check_ca(X509 *x)
{
if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x)) {
return 0;
}
return check_ca(x);
}
static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
int ca)
{
if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_CLIENT))
return 0;
if (ca)
return check_ca(x);
/* We need to do digital signatures or key agreement */
if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_KEY_AGREEMENT))
return 0;
/* nsCertType if present should allow SSL client use */
if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_CLIENT))
return 0;
return 1;
}
/*
* Key usage needed for TLS/SSL server: digital signature, encipherment or
* key agreement. The ssl code can check this more thoroughly for individual
* key types.
*/
#define KU_TLS \
(KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT|KU_KEY_AGREEMENT)
static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
int ca)
{
if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_SERVER))
return 0;
if (ca)
return check_ca(x);
if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_SERVER))
return 0;
if (ku_reject(x, KU_TLS))
return 0;
return 1;
}
static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
int ca)
{
int ret;
ret = check_purpose_ssl_server(xp, x, ca);
if (!ret || ca)
return ret;
/* We need to encipher or Netscape complains */
if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT))
return 0;
return ret;
}
/* purpose_smime returns one if |x| is a valid S/MIME leaf (|ca| is zero) or CA
* (|ca| is one) certificate, and zero otherwise. */
static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca)
{
if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SMIME))
return 0;
if (ca) {
/* check nsCertType if present */
if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) &&
(x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME_CA) == 0) {
return 0;
}
return check_ca(x);
}
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) {
return (x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME) == NS_SMIME;
}
return 1;
}
static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
int ca)
{
int ret;
ret = purpose_smime(x, ca);
if (!ret || ca)
return ret;
if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_NON_REPUDIATION))
return 0;
return ret;
}
static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
int ca)
{
int ret;
ret = purpose_smime(x, ca);
if (!ret || ca)
return ret;
if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT))
return 0;
return ret;
}
static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
int ca)
{
if (ca) {
return check_ca(x);
}
if (ku_reject(x, KU_CRL_SIGN))
return 0;
return 1;
}
/*
* OCSP helper: this is *not* a full OCSP check. It just checks that each CA
* is valid. Additional checks must be made on the chain.
*/
static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
{
if (ca)
return check_ca(x);
/* leaf certificate is checked in OCSP_verify() */
return 1;
}
static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
int ca)
{
int i_ext;
/* If ca is true we must return if this is a valid CA certificate. */
if (ca)
return check_ca(x);
/*
* Check the optional key usage field:
* if Key Usage is present, it must be one of digitalSignature
* and/or nonRepudiation (other values are not consistent and shall
* be rejected).
*/
if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE)
&& ((x->ex_kusage & ~(KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) ||
!(x->ex_kusage & (KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))))
return 0;
/* Only time stamp key usage is permitted and it's required. */
if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) || x->ex_xkusage != XKU_TIMESTAMP)
return 0;
/* Extended Key Usage MUST be critical */
i_ext = X509_get_ext_by_NID((X509 *)x, NID_ext_key_usage, -1);
if (i_ext >= 0) {
X509_EXTENSION *ext = X509_get_ext((X509 *)x, i_ext);
if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext))
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
{
return 1;
}
/*
* Various checks to see if one certificate issued the second. This can be
* used to prune a set of possible issuer certificates which have been looked
* up using some simple method such as by subject name. These are: 1. Check
* issuer_name(subject) == subject_name(issuer) 2. If akid(subject) exists
* check it matches issuer 3. If key_usage(issuer) exists check it supports
* certificate signing returns 0 for OK, positive for reason for mismatch,
* reasons match codes for X509_verify_cert()
*/
int X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject)
{
if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(issuer),
X509_get_issuer_name(subject)))
return X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH;
if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer) ||
!x509v3_cache_extensions(subject)) {
return X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
}
if (subject->akid) {
int ret = X509_check_akid(issuer, subject->akid);
if (ret != X509_V_OK)
return ret;
}
if (subject->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))
return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE;
} else if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN;
return X509_V_OK;
}
int X509_check_akid(X509 *issuer, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid)
{
if (!akid)
return X509_V_OK;
/* Check key ids (if present) */
if (akid->keyid && issuer->skid &&
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(akid->keyid, issuer->skid))
return X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH;
/* Check serial number */
if (akid->serial &&
ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(issuer), akid->serial))
return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
/* Check issuer name */
if (akid->issuer) {
/*
* Ugh, for some peculiar reason AKID includes SEQUENCE OF
* GeneralName. So look for a DirName. There may be more than one but
* we only take any notice of the first.
*/
GENERAL_NAMES *gens;
GENERAL_NAME *gen;
X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
size_t i;
gens = akid->issuer;
for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) {
nm = gen->d.dirn;
break;
}
}
if (nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_issuer_name(issuer)))
return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
}
return X509_V_OK;
}
uint32_t X509_get_extension_flags(X509 *x)
{
/* Ignore the return value. On failure, |x->ex_flags| will include
* |EXFLAG_INVALID|. */
x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
return x->ex_flags;
}
uint32_t X509_get_key_usage(X509 *x)
{
if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x)) {
return 0;
}
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE)
return x->ex_kusage;
return UINT32_MAX;
}
uint32_t X509_get_extended_key_usage(X509 *x)
{
if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x)) {
return 0;
}
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE)
return x->ex_xkusage;
return UINT32_MAX;
}
const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_get0_subject_key_id(X509 *x509)
{
if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x509)) {
return NULL;
}
return x509->skid;
}
const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_get0_authority_key_id(X509 *x509)
{
if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x509)) {
return NULL;
}
return x509->akid != NULL ? x509->akid->keyid : NULL;
}
const GENERAL_NAMES *X509_get0_authority_issuer(X509 *x509)
{
if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x509)) {
return NULL;
}
return x509->akid != NULL ? x509->akid->issuer : NULL;
}
const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_authority_serial(X509 *x509)
{
if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x509)) {
return NULL;
}
return x509->akid != NULL ? x509->akid->serial : NULL;
}
long X509_get_pathlen(X509 *x509)
{
if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x509) ||
(x509->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) == 0) {
return -1;
}
return x509->ex_pathlen;
}