ref: 8bc69a872883224675a55db51ac8f60ab5ed9e5a
dir: /third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/evp/evp_test.cc/
/*
* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
* project.
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2015 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* licensing@OpenSSL.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*/
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
OPENSSL_MSVC_PRAGMA(warning(push))
OPENSSL_MSVC_PRAGMA(warning(disable: 4702))
#include <map>
#include <string>
#include <utility>
#include <vector>
OPENSSL_MSVC_PRAGMA(warning(pop))
#include <gtest/gtest.h>
#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/digest.h>
#include <openssl/dsa.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include "../test/file_test.h"
#include "../test/test_util.h"
#include "../test/wycheproof_util.h"
// evp_test dispatches between multiple test types. PrivateKey tests take a key
// name parameter and single block, decode it as a PEM private key, and save it
// under that key name. Decrypt, Sign, and Verify tests take a previously
// imported key name as parameter and test their respective operations.
static const EVP_MD *GetDigest(FileTest *t, const std::string &name) {
if (name == "MD5") {
return EVP_md5();
} else if (name == "SHA1") {
return EVP_sha1();
} else if (name == "SHA224") {
return EVP_sha224();
} else if (name == "SHA256") {
return EVP_sha256();
} else if (name == "SHA384") {
return EVP_sha384();
} else if (name == "SHA512") {
return EVP_sha512();
}
ADD_FAILURE() << "Unknown digest: " << name;
return nullptr;
}
static int GetKeyType(FileTest *t, const std::string &name) {
if (name == "RSA") {
return EVP_PKEY_RSA;
}
if (name == "EC") {
return EVP_PKEY_EC;
}
if (name == "DSA") {
return EVP_PKEY_DSA;
}
if (name == "Ed25519") {
return EVP_PKEY_ED25519;
}
if (name == "X25519") {
return EVP_PKEY_X25519;
}
ADD_FAILURE() << "Unknown key type: " << name;
return EVP_PKEY_NONE;
}
static int GetRSAPadding(FileTest *t, int *out, const std::string &name) {
if (name == "PKCS1") {
*out = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
return true;
}
if (name == "PSS") {
*out = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
return true;
}
if (name == "OAEP") {
*out = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
return true;
}
ADD_FAILURE() << "Unknown RSA padding mode: " << name;
return false;
}
using KeyMap = std::map<std::string, bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY>>;
static bool ImportKey(FileTest *t, KeyMap *key_map,
EVP_PKEY *(*parse_func)(CBS *cbs),
int (*marshal_func)(CBB *cbb, const EVP_PKEY *key)) {
std::vector<uint8_t> input;
if (!t->GetBytes(&input, "Input")) {
return false;
}
CBS cbs;
CBS_init(&cbs, input.data(), input.size());
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pkey(parse_func(&cbs));
if (!pkey) {
return false;
}
std::string key_type;
if (!t->GetAttribute(&key_type, "Type")) {
return false;
}
EXPECT_EQ(GetKeyType(t, key_type), EVP_PKEY_id(pkey.get()));
// The key must re-encode correctly.
bssl::ScopedCBB cbb;
uint8_t *der;
size_t der_len;
if (!CBB_init(cbb.get(), 0) ||
!marshal_func(cbb.get(), pkey.get()) ||
!CBB_finish(cbb.get(), &der, &der_len)) {
return false;
}
bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> free_der(der);
std::vector<uint8_t> output = input;
if (t->HasAttribute("Output") &&
!t->GetBytes(&output, "Output")) {
return false;
}
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(output), Bytes(der, der_len))
<< "Re-encoding the key did not match.";
if (t->HasAttribute("ExpectNoRawPrivate")) {
size_t len;
EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_PKEY_get_raw_private_key(pkey.get(), nullptr, &len));
} else if (t->HasAttribute("ExpectRawPrivate")) {
std::vector<uint8_t> expected;
if (!t->GetBytes(&expected, "ExpectRawPrivate")) {
return false;
}
std::vector<uint8_t> raw;
size_t len;
if (!EVP_PKEY_get_raw_private_key(pkey.get(), nullptr, &len)) {
return false;
}
raw.resize(len);
if (!EVP_PKEY_get_raw_private_key(pkey.get(), raw.data(), &len)) {
return false;
}
raw.resize(len);
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(raw), Bytes(expected));
// Short buffers should be rejected.
raw.resize(len - 1);
len = raw.size();
EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_PKEY_get_raw_private_key(pkey.get(), raw.data(), &len));
}
if (t->HasAttribute("ExpectNoRawPublic")) {
size_t len;
EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_PKEY_get_raw_public_key(pkey.get(), nullptr, &len));
} else if (t->HasAttribute("ExpectRawPublic")) {
std::vector<uint8_t> expected;
if (!t->GetBytes(&expected, "ExpectRawPublic")) {
return false;
}
std::vector<uint8_t> raw;
size_t len;
if (!EVP_PKEY_get_raw_public_key(pkey.get(), nullptr, &len)) {
return false;
}
raw.resize(len);
if (!EVP_PKEY_get_raw_public_key(pkey.get(), raw.data(), &len)) {
return false;
}
raw.resize(len);
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(raw), Bytes(expected));
// Short buffers should be rejected.
raw.resize(len - 1);
len = raw.size();
EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_PKEY_get_raw_public_key(pkey.get(), raw.data(), &len));
}
// Save the key for future tests.
const std::string &key_name = t->GetParameter();
EXPECT_EQ(0u, key_map->count(key_name)) << "Duplicate key: " << key_name;
(*key_map)[key_name] = std::move(pkey);
return true;
}
// SetupContext configures |ctx| based on attributes in |t|, with the exception
// of the signing digest which must be configured externally.
static bool SetupContext(FileTest *t, KeyMap *key_map, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) {
if (t->HasAttribute("RSAPadding")) {
int padding;
if (!GetRSAPadding(t, &padding, t->GetAttributeOrDie("RSAPadding")) ||
!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, padding)) {
return false;
}
}
if (t->HasAttribute("PSSSaltLength") &&
!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(
ctx, atoi(t->GetAttributeOrDie("PSSSaltLength").c_str()))) {
return false;
}
if (t->HasAttribute("MGF1Digest")) {
const EVP_MD *digest = GetDigest(t, t->GetAttributeOrDie("MGF1Digest"));
if (digest == nullptr || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(ctx, digest)) {
return false;
}
}
if (t->HasAttribute("OAEPDigest")) {
const EVP_MD *digest = GetDigest(t, t->GetAttributeOrDie("OAEPDigest"));
if (digest == nullptr || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md(ctx, digest)) {
return false;
}
}
if (t->HasAttribute("OAEPLabel")) {
std::vector<uint8_t> label;
if (!t->GetBytes(&label, "OAEPLabel")) {
return false;
}
// For historical reasons, |EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label| expects to be
// take ownership of the input.
bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> buf(reinterpret_cast<uint8_t *>(
OPENSSL_memdup(label.data(), label.size())));
if (!buf ||
!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(ctx, buf.get(), label.size())) {
return false;
}
buf.release();
}
if (t->HasAttribute("DerivePeer")) {
std::string derive_peer = t->GetAttributeOrDie("DerivePeer");
if (key_map->count(derive_peer) == 0) {
ADD_FAILURE() << "Could not find key " << derive_peer;
return false;
}
EVP_PKEY *derive_peer_key = (*key_map)[derive_peer].get();
if (!EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, derive_peer_key)) {
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
static bool TestDerive(FileTest *t, KeyMap *key_map, EVP_PKEY *key) {
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY_CTX> ctx(EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(key, nullptr));
if (!ctx ||
!EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx.get()) ||
!SetupContext(t, key_map, ctx.get())) {
return false;
}
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY_CTX> copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX_dup(ctx.get()));
if (!copy) {
return false;
}
for (EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx : {ctx.get(), copy.get()}) {
size_t len;
std::vector<uint8_t> actual, output;
if (!EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, nullptr, &len)) {
return false;
}
actual.resize(len);
if (!EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, actual.data(), &len)) {
return false;
}
actual.resize(len);
// Defer looking up the attribute so Error works properly.
if (!t->GetBytes(&output, "Output")) {
return false;
}
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(output), Bytes(actual));
// Test when the buffer is too large.
actual.resize(len + 1);
len = actual.size();
if (!EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, actual.data(), &len)) {
return false;
}
actual.resize(len);
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(output), Bytes(actual));
// Test when the buffer is too small.
actual.resize(len - 1);
len = actual.size();
if (t->HasAttribute("SmallBufferTruncates")) {
if (!EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, actual.data(), &len)) {
return false;
}
actual.resize(len);
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(output.data(), len), Bytes(actual));
} else {
EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, actual.data(), &len));
ERR_clear_error();
}
}
return true;
}
static bool TestEVP(FileTest *t, KeyMap *key_map) {
if (t->GetType() == "PrivateKey") {
return ImportKey(t, key_map, EVP_parse_private_key,
EVP_marshal_private_key);
}
if (t->GetType() == "PublicKey") {
return ImportKey(t, key_map, EVP_parse_public_key, EVP_marshal_public_key);
}
// Load the key.
const std::string &key_name = t->GetParameter();
if (key_map->count(key_name) == 0) {
ADD_FAILURE() << "Could not find key " << key_name;
return false;
}
EVP_PKEY *key = (*key_map)[key_name].get();
int (*key_op_init)(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) = nullptr;
int (*key_op)(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) = nullptr;
int (*md_op_init)(EVP_MD_CTX * ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX * *pctx, const EVP_MD *type,
ENGINE *e, EVP_PKEY *pkey) = nullptr;
bool is_verify = false;
if (t->GetType() == "Decrypt") {
key_op_init = EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init;
key_op = EVP_PKEY_decrypt;
} else if (t->GetType() == "Sign") {
key_op_init = EVP_PKEY_sign_init;
key_op = EVP_PKEY_sign;
} else if (t->GetType() == "Verify") {
key_op_init = EVP_PKEY_verify_init;
is_verify = true;
} else if (t->GetType() == "SignMessage") {
md_op_init = EVP_DigestSignInit;
} else if (t->GetType() == "VerifyMessage") {
md_op_init = EVP_DigestVerifyInit;
is_verify = true;
} else if (t->GetType() == "Encrypt") {
key_op_init = EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init;
key_op = EVP_PKEY_encrypt;
} else if (t->GetType() == "Derive") {
return TestDerive(t, key_map, key);
} else {
ADD_FAILURE() << "Unknown test " << t->GetType();
return false;
}
const EVP_MD *digest = nullptr;
if (t->HasAttribute("Digest")) {
digest = GetDigest(t, t->GetAttributeOrDie("Digest"));
if (digest == nullptr) {
return false;
}
}
// For verify tests, the "output" is the signature. Read it now so that, for
// tests which expect a failure in SetupContext, the attribute is still
// consumed.
std::vector<uint8_t> input, actual, output;
if (!t->GetBytes(&input, "Input") ||
(is_verify && !t->GetBytes(&output, "Output"))) {
return false;
}
if (md_op_init) {
bssl::ScopedEVP_MD_CTX ctx, copy;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
if (!md_op_init(ctx.get(), &pctx, digest, nullptr, key) ||
!SetupContext(t, key_map, pctx) ||
!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(copy.get(), ctx.get())) {
return false;
}
if (is_verify) {
return EVP_DigestVerify(ctx.get(), output.data(), output.size(),
input.data(), input.size()) &&
EVP_DigestVerify(copy.get(), output.data(), output.size(),
input.data(), input.size());
}
size_t len;
if (!EVP_DigestSign(ctx.get(), nullptr, &len, input.data(), input.size())) {
return false;
}
actual.resize(len);
if (!EVP_DigestSign(ctx.get(), actual.data(), &len, input.data(),
input.size()) ||
!t->GetBytes(&output, "Output")) {
return false;
}
actual.resize(len);
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(output), Bytes(actual));
// Repeat the test with |copy|, to check |EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex| duplicated
// everything.
if (!EVP_DigestSign(copy.get(), nullptr, &len, input.data(),
input.size())) {
return false;
}
actual.resize(len);
if (!EVP_DigestSign(copy.get(), actual.data(), &len, input.data(),
input.size()) ||
!t->GetBytes(&output, "Output")) {
return false;
}
actual.resize(len);
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(output), Bytes(actual));
return true;
}
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY_CTX> ctx(EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(key, nullptr));
if (!ctx ||
!key_op_init(ctx.get()) ||
(digest != nullptr &&
!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(ctx.get(), digest)) ||
!SetupContext(t, key_map, ctx.get())) {
return false;
}
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY_CTX> copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX_dup(ctx.get()));
if (!copy) {
return false;
}
if (is_verify) {
return EVP_PKEY_verify(ctx.get(), output.data(), output.size(),
input.data(), input.size()) &&
EVP_PKEY_verify(copy.get(), output.data(), output.size(),
input.data(), input.size());
}
for (EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx : {ctx.get(), copy.get()}) {
size_t len;
if (!key_op(pctx, nullptr, &len, input.data(), input.size())) {
return false;
}
actual.resize(len);
if (!key_op(pctx, actual.data(), &len, input.data(), input.size())) {
return false;
}
if (t->HasAttribute("CheckDecrypt")) {
// Encryption is non-deterministic, so we check by decrypting.
size_t plaintext_len;
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY_CTX> decrypt_ctx(EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(key, nullptr));
if (!decrypt_ctx ||
!EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(decrypt_ctx.get()) ||
(digest != nullptr &&
!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(decrypt_ctx.get(), digest)) ||
!SetupContext(t, key_map, decrypt_ctx.get()) ||
!EVP_PKEY_decrypt(decrypt_ctx.get(), nullptr, &plaintext_len,
actual.data(), actual.size())) {
return false;
}
output.resize(plaintext_len);
if (!EVP_PKEY_decrypt(decrypt_ctx.get(), output.data(), &plaintext_len,
actual.data(), actual.size())) {
ADD_FAILURE() << "Could not decrypt result.";
return false;
}
output.resize(plaintext_len);
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(input), Bytes(output)) << "Decrypted result mismatch.";
} else if (t->HasAttribute("CheckVerify")) {
// Some signature schemes are non-deterministic, so we check by verifying.
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY_CTX> verify_ctx(EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(key, nullptr));
if (!verify_ctx ||
!EVP_PKEY_verify_init(verify_ctx.get()) ||
(digest != nullptr &&
!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(verify_ctx.get(), digest)) ||
!SetupContext(t, key_map, verify_ctx.get())) {
return false;
}
if (t->HasAttribute("VerifyPSSSaltLength")) {
if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(
verify_ctx.get(),
atoi(t->GetAttributeOrDie("VerifyPSSSaltLength").c_str()))) {
return false;
}
}
EXPECT_TRUE(EVP_PKEY_verify(verify_ctx.get(), actual.data(),
actual.size(), input.data(), input.size()))
<< "Could not verify result.";
} else {
// By default, check by comparing the result against Output.
if (!t->GetBytes(&output, "Output")) {
return false;
}
actual.resize(len);
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(output), Bytes(actual));
}
}
return true;
}
TEST(EVPTest, TestVectors) {
KeyMap key_map;
FileTestGTest("crypto/evp/evp_tests.txt", [&](FileTest *t) {
bool result = TestEVP(t, &key_map);
if (t->HasAttribute("Error")) {
ASSERT_FALSE(result) << "Operation unexpectedly succeeded.";
uint32_t err = ERR_peek_error();
EXPECT_EQ(t->GetAttributeOrDie("Error"), ERR_reason_error_string(err));
} else if (!result) {
ADD_FAILURE() << "Operation unexpectedly failed.";
}
});
}
static void RunWycheproofVerifyTest(const char *path) {
SCOPED_TRACE(path);
FileTestGTest(path, [](FileTest *t) {
t->IgnoreAllUnusedInstructions();
std::vector<uint8_t> der;
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetInstructionBytes(&der, "keyDer"));
CBS cbs;
CBS_init(&cbs, der.data(), der.size());
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> key(EVP_parse_public_key(&cbs));
ASSERT_TRUE(key);
const EVP_MD *md = nullptr;
if (t->HasInstruction("sha")) {
md = GetWycheproofDigest(t, "sha", true);
ASSERT_TRUE(md);
}
bool is_pss = t->HasInstruction("mgf");
const EVP_MD *mgf1_md = nullptr;
int pss_salt_len = -1;
if (is_pss) {
ASSERT_EQ("MGF1", t->GetInstructionOrDie("mgf"));
mgf1_md = GetWycheproofDigest(t, "mgfSha", true);
std::string s_len;
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetInstruction(&s_len, "sLen"));
pss_salt_len = atoi(s_len.c_str());
}
std::vector<uint8_t> msg;
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&msg, "msg"));
std::vector<uint8_t> sig;
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&sig, "sig"));
WycheproofResult result;
ASSERT_TRUE(GetWycheproofResult(t, &result));
if (EVP_PKEY_id(key.get()) == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
// DSA is deprecated and is not usable via EVP.
DSA *dsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(key.get());
uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned digest_len;
ASSERT_TRUE(
EVP_Digest(msg.data(), msg.size(), digest, &digest_len, md, nullptr));
int valid;
bool sig_ok = DSA_check_signature(&valid, digest, digest_len, sig.data(),
sig.size(), dsa) &&
valid;
EXPECT_EQ(sig_ok, result.IsValid());
} else {
bssl::ScopedEVP_MD_CTX ctx;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
ASSERT_TRUE(
EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx.get(), &pctx, md, nullptr, key.get()));
if (is_pss) {
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING));
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(pctx, mgf1_md));
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, pss_salt_len));
}
int ret = EVP_DigestVerify(ctx.get(), sig.data(), sig.size(), msg.data(),
msg.size());
// BoringSSL does not enforce policies on weak keys and leaves it to the
// caller.
EXPECT_EQ(ret,
result.IsValid({"SmallModulus", "SmallPublicKey", "WeakHash"})
? 1
: 0);
}
});
}
TEST(EVPTest, WycheproofDSA) {
RunWycheproofVerifyTest("third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/dsa_test.txt");
}
TEST(EVPTest, WycheproofECDSAP224) {
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/ecdsa_secp224r1_sha224_test.txt");
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/ecdsa_secp224r1_sha256_test.txt");
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/ecdsa_secp224r1_sha512_test.txt");
}
TEST(EVPTest, WycheproofECDSAP256) {
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256_test.txt");
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/ecdsa_secp256r1_sha512_test.txt");
}
TEST(EVPTest, WycheproofECDSAP384) {
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384_test.txt");
}
TEST(EVPTest, WycheproofECDSAP521) {
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/ecdsa_secp384r1_sha512_test.txt");
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512_test.txt");
}
TEST(EVPTest, WycheproofEdDSA) {
RunWycheproofVerifyTest("third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/eddsa_test.txt");
}
TEST(EVPTest, WycheproofRSAPKCS1) {
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_signature_2048_sha224_test.txt");
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_signature_2048_sha256_test.txt");
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_signature_2048_sha384_test.txt");
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_signature_2048_sha512_test.txt");
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_signature_3072_sha256_test.txt");
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_signature_3072_sha384_test.txt");
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_signature_3072_sha512_test.txt");
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_signature_4096_sha384_test.txt");
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_signature_4096_sha512_test.txt");
// TODO(davidben): Is this file redundant with the tests above?
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_signature_test.txt");
}
TEST(EVPTest, WycheproofRSAPKCS1Sign) {
FileTestGTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_sig_gen_misc_test.txt",
[](FileTest *t) {
t->IgnoreAllUnusedInstructions();
std::vector<uint8_t> pkcs8;
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetInstructionBytes(&pkcs8, "privateKeyPkcs8"));
CBS cbs;
CBS_init(&cbs, pkcs8.data(), pkcs8.size());
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> key(EVP_parse_private_key(&cbs));
ASSERT_TRUE(key);
const EVP_MD *md = GetWycheproofDigest(t, "sha", true);
ASSERT_TRUE(md);
std::vector<uint8_t> msg, sig;
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&msg, "msg"));
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&sig, "sig"));
WycheproofResult result;
ASSERT_TRUE(GetWycheproofResult(t, &result));
bssl::ScopedEVP_MD_CTX ctx;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
ASSERT_TRUE(
EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx.get(), &pctx, md, nullptr, key.get()));
std::vector<uint8_t> out(EVP_PKEY_size(key.get()));
size_t len = out.size();
int ret =
EVP_DigestSign(ctx.get(), out.data(), &len, msg.data(), msg.size());
// BoringSSL does not enforce policies on weak keys and leaves it to the
// caller.
bool is_valid =
result.IsValid({"SmallModulus", "SmallPublicKey", "WeakHash"});
EXPECT_EQ(ret, is_valid ? 1 : 0);
if (is_valid) {
out.resize(len);
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(sig), Bytes(out));
}
});
}
TEST(EVPTest, WycheproofRSAPSS) {
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_pss_2048_sha1_mgf1_20_test.txt");
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_pss_2048_sha256_mgf1_0_test.txt");
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/"
"rsa_pss_2048_sha256_mgf1_32_test.txt");
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/"
"rsa_pss_3072_sha256_mgf1_32_test.txt");
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/"
"rsa_pss_4096_sha256_mgf1_32_test.txt");
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/"
"rsa_pss_4096_sha512_mgf1_32_test.txt");
RunWycheproofVerifyTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_pss_misc_test.txt");
}
static void RunWycheproofDecryptTest(
const char *path,
std::function<void(FileTest *, EVP_PKEY_CTX *)> setup_cb) {
FileTestGTest(path, [&](FileTest *t) {
t->IgnoreAllUnusedInstructions();
std::vector<uint8_t> pkcs8;
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetInstructionBytes(&pkcs8, "privateKeyPkcs8"));
CBS cbs;
CBS_init(&cbs, pkcs8.data(), pkcs8.size());
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> key(EVP_parse_private_key(&cbs));
ASSERT_TRUE(key);
std::vector<uint8_t> ct, msg;
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&ct, "ct"));
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&msg, "msg"));
WycheproofResult result;
ASSERT_TRUE(GetWycheproofResult(t, &result));
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY_CTX> ctx(EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(key.get(), nullptr));
ASSERT_TRUE(ctx);
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ctx.get()));
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(setup_cb(t, ctx.get()));
std::vector<uint8_t> out(EVP_PKEY_size(key.get()));
size_t len = out.size();
int ret =
EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx.get(), out.data(), &len, ct.data(), ct.size());
// BoringSSL does not enforce policies on weak keys and leaves it to the
// caller.
bool is_valid = result.IsValid({"SmallModulus"});
EXPECT_EQ(ret, is_valid ? 1 : 0);
if (is_valid) {
out.resize(len);
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(msg), Bytes(out));
}
});
}
static void RunWycheproofOAEPTest(const char *path) {
RunWycheproofDecryptTest(path, [](FileTest *t, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) {
const EVP_MD *md = GetWycheproofDigest(t, "sha", true);
ASSERT_TRUE(md);
const EVP_MD *mgf1_md = GetWycheproofDigest(t, "mgfSha", true);
ASSERT_TRUE(mgf1_md);
std::vector<uint8_t> label;
ASSERT_TRUE(t->GetBytes(&label, "label"));
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING));
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md(ctx, md));
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(ctx, mgf1_md));
bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> label_copy(
static_cast<uint8_t *>(OPENSSL_memdup(label.data(), label.size())));
ASSERT_TRUE(label_copy || label.empty());
ASSERT_TRUE(
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(ctx, label_copy.get(), label.size()));
// |EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label| takes ownership on success.
label_copy.release();
});
}
TEST(EVPTest, WycheproofRSAOAEP2048) {
RunWycheproofOAEPTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/"
"rsa_oaep_2048_sha1_mgf1sha1_test.txt");
RunWycheproofOAEPTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/"
"rsa_oaep_2048_sha224_mgf1sha1_test.txt");
RunWycheproofOAEPTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/"
"rsa_oaep_2048_sha224_mgf1sha224_test.txt");
RunWycheproofOAEPTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/"
"rsa_oaep_2048_sha256_mgf1sha1_test.txt");
RunWycheproofOAEPTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/"
"rsa_oaep_2048_sha256_mgf1sha256_test.txt");
RunWycheproofOAEPTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/"
"rsa_oaep_2048_sha384_mgf1sha1_test.txt");
RunWycheproofOAEPTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/"
"rsa_oaep_2048_sha384_mgf1sha384_test.txt");
RunWycheproofOAEPTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/"
"rsa_oaep_2048_sha512_mgf1sha1_test.txt");
RunWycheproofOAEPTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/"
"rsa_oaep_2048_sha512_mgf1sha512_test.txt");
}
TEST(EVPTest, WycheproofRSAOAEP3072) {
RunWycheproofOAEPTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/"
"rsa_oaep_3072_sha256_mgf1sha1_test.txt");
RunWycheproofOAEPTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/"
"rsa_oaep_3072_sha256_mgf1sha256_test.txt");
RunWycheproofOAEPTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/"
"rsa_oaep_3072_sha512_mgf1sha1_test.txt");
RunWycheproofOAEPTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/"
"rsa_oaep_3072_sha512_mgf1sha512_test.txt");
}
TEST(EVPTest, WycheproofRSAOAEP4096) {
RunWycheproofOAEPTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/"
"rsa_oaep_4096_sha256_mgf1sha1_test.txt");
RunWycheproofOAEPTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/"
"rsa_oaep_4096_sha256_mgf1sha256_test.txt");
RunWycheproofOAEPTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/"
"rsa_oaep_4096_sha512_mgf1sha1_test.txt");
RunWycheproofOAEPTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/"
"rsa_oaep_4096_sha512_mgf1sha512_test.txt");
}
TEST(EVPTest, WycheproofRSAOAEPMisc) {
RunWycheproofOAEPTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_oaep_misc_test.txt");
}
static void RunWycheproofPKCS1DecryptTest(const char *path) {
RunWycheproofDecryptTest(path, [](FileTest *t, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) {
// No setup needed. PKCS#1 is, sadly, the default.
});
}
TEST(EVPTest, WycheproofRSAPKCS1Decrypt) {
RunWycheproofPKCS1DecryptTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_pkcs1_2048_test.txt");
RunWycheproofPKCS1DecryptTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_pkcs1_3072_test.txt");
RunWycheproofPKCS1DecryptTest(
"third_party/wycheproof_testvectors/rsa_pkcs1_4096_test.txt");
}